exact must tolerate inexact
case.5

(C1){
It would seem that in any case in which we name some {transcendental origin}, that we have done so is itself a failure of that named thing to be what a transcendental origin ought to be. Such a transcendental origin 'by definition ought to be' something for which it is impossible to even conceive the falsehood of, or that it is impossible to conceive of any regarding identity for which the origin would be false. But if we name a proposition, it means we can, even in some barest sense, epistemically entertain its falsehood.
}(C1)

(C2){
It would seem that if we identify something as a {contradiction}, that we have identified such a thing is itself evidence against its being an 'actual contradiction'. This is in the contexts of contradiction as necessarily non-existent. Imagine an empty type in type theory. The above 'identification of a thing as a contradiction' might be like typing some value as the empty type.
}(C2)

(S1){
One could think of {such cases; (C1),(C2)} as particularly idiosyncratic. That they are what happens if one very carefully chooses the meaning we understand from some designation to be something like the impossibility to make such a designation. That they are a sort of adversarially constructed degeneracy of an otherwise well behaved situation.
}(S1)

(S2){
But one {alternative; to (S1)} could be to think of {such cases; (C1),(C2)} more as just one of two dual ways to relate some sides. In this view, (P1){identifying something/designating something/naming something/defining something} would be seen as relating some (R1){?prior unidentified stuff?} and some (R2){?contextualizing role?}. The particular phrases we use for these relata are difficult and open. Perhaps this is no surprise, as selecting a particular phrase is itself something of {this very activity of designation; (P1)}
}(S2)

To devote our eye to {such a perspective; (S2)}, we would understand something generic of how there can be different ways of relating some relata. Specifically so as it pertains to dual such ways (perhaps with such a duality itself being of that recursive way of the radical relation).

This would likely appeal to radical way of the relation: that a particular relation between two relata is the relation between the perspective of the two relata as distinct and the perspective of the two relata as identical.

Then, we would understand what the {orthodox way} that the {activity of designation; (P1)} would so relate. This would be the assumed meaning, the assumed principle or policy that is default in the ambient usage. And perhaps in the same understanding, we would locate the {distinguished way} that we have discussed as being what the above {cases; (C1), (C2)} gesture towards.

I wish to avoid overmuch preempting this probe, but it may be something of the 'identification' versus 'distinction' via the radical relation, inasmuch as it is conventional to actually call the {activity of designation; (P1)} an {activity of identification}.